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1. Introduction  
The study of coalitions in multiparty governments is an upcoming scholarly field. Thies 
(2001) was one of the first scholars to ask the question: how do coalitions govern? Before this 
the main focus in the literature was on the formation and separation of coalitions (Thies, 2001, 
p. 580). However, this question is important because economic and social outcomes are 
shaped by government policy, therefore the way citizens experience the quality of democracy 
is closely tied to the ability of multiparty governments to make and implement policy (Martin 
& Vanberg, 2011, p. 2). For this reason it is of interest to understand how coalitions deal with 
the challenges of joint governance.  
Martin and Vanberg argue rightly that there are three features of multiparty governance that 
may lead to tensions. First of all, coalition governance requires compromise because to be 
able to govern effectively parties with divergent preferences have to agree on joint policy 
initiatives. Secondly, coalition partners have to trust other parties’ ministers by giving them 
substantial authority of policies. This may give these ministers an informational advantage 
over other coalition partners because they have more resources where they can get 
information from. The third feature is the pressure of electoral competition, this means that 
even though coalition parties make a policy together, they are held accountable to this policy 
separately (Martin & Vanberg, 2011, p. 3).  
The above mentioned features can be summarized into three elements: compromise, 
delegation and electoral competition. These three elements are one of the reasons that makes 
single-party government different from multiparty government because it may lead to tensions 
within the coalition. Compromising may be more difficult within a coalition government than 
within a single-party government due to pressures of electoral competition between parties 
and because both parties may have a different view on a certain policy. This competition 
makes delegation of authority to other parties ministers tricky because there exists the 
possibility that ministers will be tempted to undermine coalition compromises and try to form 
policies that may favour their own party instead. This may lead to attempts of other coalition 
partners to watch and monitor ministers. The outcome of this can be called the dilemma of 
coalition governance, because to be able to govern successfully coalition partners must 
overcome the tension between the collective interest and individual incentives to pursue a 
particular policy objective. (Martin & Vanberg, 2011, pp. 3-4). 
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Since the original purpose of parliament is to watch and control the government (Mill, 1861, 
p. 73), it is important for society that parliament fulfills this purpose. Parliament can be seen 
as the link between civil society and the government. Members of Parliament (MP) are 
elected in order to  protect and defend the interests of the public, they are the representatives 
of the people (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, p. 164). At the same time, if a party is elected for 
government their MPs may end up being in a dilemma where on the one hand they are tasked 
to watch and control the government and on the other hand they have to be loyal towards their 
party and support them in parliament.  
The purpose of my study is to examine the dilemma that occurs in a coalition government and 
how parties try to solve this dilemma. This research examines two Dutch legislative 
committees as a case study. Therefore, the research question of this thesis is: To what extent 
do committee members of the governing parties VVD and PvdA use the legislative committee 
system as an instrument to keep tabs on the Minister of Defence and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs? 
This thesis builds on Martin and Vanbergs argument that the control function of parliament 
can be an efficient check to control the minister of another party. I am going to examine what 
kind of attitude committee members take on when they are in a meeting with the minister. To 
what extent do they use the legislative committee system as an instrument to keep tabs on 
their partners? And at the same time, are they focused on controlling their own minister as 
well or do they tend to support their own minister due to party discipline?   
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2. Research question  
The current Dutch coalition government is an interesting case to examine the dilemma of 
coalition government. Not only do the coalition parties VVD and PvdA differ from each other 
on the ideological spectrum, also the fact that the coalition consists of two parties makes it a 
suitable case to examine the attitude of committee members of the governing parties towards 
the government. Therefore the main research question of this thesis is: To what extent do 
committee members of the governing parties VVD and PvdA use the legislative committee 
system as an instrument to keep tabs on the Minister of Defence and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs? In order to answer this question a comparative case study was conducted that 
examines the attitudes of committee members of the Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs 
towards the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the attitudes of committee members of the 
Standing Committee for Defence towards the Minister of Defence. Both ministers are from a 
different party, the Minister of Defence is a member of the VVD, which is the liberal party. 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs is a member of the PvdA, which is the labour party. To be 
able to measure the attitudes of the committee members, a content analysis of committee 
meetings held with the ministers was conducted.  
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3. Theory and theoretical framework  
Coalition dilemma 
It is argued that parliamentary government can be viewed as a chain of delegation in which 
voters delegate to MPs, MPs delegate to cabinet as a whole, cabinet in turn delegates to 
ministers and ministers delegate to agency bureaucrats. The same question arises at each 
delegation point in the chain: what can principals do to make sure their agents act in the 
interest of the principals? (Carroll & Cox, 2012, p.221). However, delegation from cabinet to 
ministers becomes more problematic when there is a multiparty government, because 
delegation must cross party lines (Thies, 2001, p. 580). Put simply, coalition partners may 
simply not be able to trust the other ministers with the task to implement policy (Carroll & 
Cox, 2012, p. 221). In addition, while it is easier for parties to monitor and control delegation 
to cabinet ministers of their party, they do not have control over other parties’ ministers. 
Therefore the question arises how multiparty governments deal with interparty delegation 
problems (Thies, 2001, p. 580). 
Thus, multiparty governments have to deal with greater delegation problems than single-party 
governments. This is for two reasons: divergence of preferences and the difficulty of 
sanctions. Ministers in a multiparty cabinet are not members of the same political party. 
Therefore it is likely that they have more divergent policy preferences than ministers in a 
single-party cabinet. This makes decision-making more difficult and makes the delegation of 
collective responsibilities more problematic. Besides, delegation to individual ministers is 
harder to control within a multiparty government. In a single-party government ministers can 
be sanctioned or rewarded within the party caucus, while in multiparty governments a 
minister of another party cannot be sanctioned or rewarded by the party caucus of a coalition 
party. Moreover there exists the possibility that a certain minister is more likely to choose the 
wishes of his party above the policy of the cabinet (Thies, 2001, p. 582). 
For example, a minister may choose to introduce and draft a bill that will be greeted favorably 
by his party and their constituents, while at the same time it may be different from the 
preferred policies of other members of the coalition. This is for the simple reason that 
ministers have a privileged position in drafting legislation, because they have an informational 
advantage. Another minister does not have the same access to information about other 
possible policy alternatives. Therefore, when a minister is challenged, it may argue that his 
policy is the best policy that suits the coalition agreement and that there is no alternative, even 
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though there might be one (Martin & Vanberg, 2011, p. 14).  Martin and Vanberg also argue 
that the pressures of electoral competition and the necessity of delegating authority to 
ministers that are affiliated with specific parties are a threat to the compromise agreements 
that are central in coalition governance. For example, ministers may try to use their position 
by drafting bills that bias policy in their party’s favor (Martin & Vanberg, 2011, p. 15). This 
may undermine and compromise agreements that are in the collective interest of the cabinet 
(Martin & Vanberg, 2011, p. 27).  
Solution of the coalition dilemma: legislative committee system 
The coalition dilemma provides a strong incentive for coalition partners to monitor the 
behavior of ministers of another party (Thies, 2001). In order to be able ‘to keep tabs on other 
partners,’ government parties are dependent on parliamentary procedures and institutions. 
Recent studies have proved the importance of parliament in the context of multiparty 
governance. The legislative process can be viewed as an institutional instrument that 
coalitions can use to counteract ministerial discretion (Martin & Vanberg, 2011, p. 18). The 
literature suggests three ways to monitor ministers. First of all, the parliamentary process in 
general can be useful as an arena in which coalition partners can learn about each other’s 
actions (Martin & Vanberg, 2005). Secondly, junior ministers from one party can keep tabs on 
cabinet ministers from another party (Thies, 2001). Thirdly, committees can be useful to 
monitor ministers (Kim & Loewenberg, 2005). Fourth, parliamentary questions can be used as 
a tool to keep coalition partners in check (Strøm, Müller, & Smith, 2010, p. 526). This thesis 
will focus on the third possibility to monitor a minister: the legislative committee system.  
The most important institution in this context is the legislative committee system (Martin & 
Vanberg, 2011, p. 34). Kim and Loewenberg argue that besides that parliamentary 
committees are an useful instrument for opposition parties to influence policy, they also 
provide an opportunity for coalition parties to monitor and watch their partners. In their 
research they show that in the German parliamentary system committee chairs are distributed 
in a certain way that makes it possible for parties to monitor their coalition partners. Their 
research provides evidence for  the theory that parliamentary parties use the position of the 
monitoring mechanism that enforces coalition agreements, which can be seen as an alternative 
to other mechanisms like junior ministers (Kim & Loewenberg, 2005). 
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An advantage of committees is that they are specialized and are therefore critical to the 
deliberative powers of parliament because they can give parliamentary bodies influence over 
policymaking (Martin & Vanberg, 2011, p. 34). Two features of committee systems are 
especially critical according to Martin and Vanberg: information acquisition and amendment 
capability. Both features should be present to be able to counteract ministerial drift. 
Information acquisition means that the committee system should provide the opportunity for 
parties to gather technical information about policy issues that are discussed. Whereas 
amendment capability means that parties should have an opportunity to press for change of a 
bill or policy (Martin & Vanberg, 2011, p. 35).  
However, there are some conditions that are crucial for the legislative process to work 
effectively and that will provide parties with the opportunity to keep tabs on their partners 
(Martin & Vanberg, 2011, p. 28).  Not every legislative committee system has the ability to 
acquire a lot of information or the ability to force change. Martin and Vanberg argue that 
there is a considerable difference between weak and strong legislative committees. Strong 
legislative committees can give far more importance to the role of parliament. This matters 
because the conventional view is that parliaments play a rather marginal role in the policy-
making process. Above all, when scholars emphasized that parliaments matter the focus was 
on the legislature as an arena for opposition and government relations and the ability to affect 
policies (Martin & Vanberg, 2011, p. 53).  
The focus of my research is on committee meetings with a minister. In these meetings 
committee questions play a central role. There is little research available on committee 
questions, however there is a lot of literature available on parliamentary questions. Russo’s 
article on the constituency as a focus of representation in Italy is an example of how 
parliamentary questions can be used as a tool to figure out which roles MPs adapt (Russo, 
2011). Moreover, Martin uses parliamentary questions to measure constituency focus in 
Ireland. His article is a good example of how content analysis of parliamentary questions can 
be applied (Martin, 2011).  
Case study: Committees in  the Netherlands 
The coalition that formed in 2012 between the centre-right wing liberal party VVD and the 
centre-left labour party PvdA is a special combination because both parties are on different 
sides of the political spectrum. Their ideal vision of society differs considerably from each 
other. However, the coalition is still going strong today and it looks like they will sit through 
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the whole session of parliament. This extraordinary coalition is interesting in many different 
ways. The coalition has to deal with a minority in the Eerste Kamer (Senate), therefore 
whenever it wants to pass a plan or bill it has to look for support from the opposition. A 
possible explanation for the fact that the coalition is still together is that both coalition parties 
kept their promise and stuck to the coalition agreement. However, this was only possible by 
the several institutional checks available from the parliamentary institution.   
Research shows that the Dutch committee system does not belong to the strongest committee 
systems in advanced industrial democracies. On the contrary, it is ranked just below the mean 
of committee strength of all advanced industrial democracies, this has mainly to do with the 
fact that Dutch parliamentary committees do not have the power to amend bills (André, 
Depauw, & Martin, 2015). Nevertheless, the committee system in the Netherlands is seen as 
particularly independent in controlling the agenda (Mattson & Strøm, 1995, p. 300). In 
particular because cabinet ministers in the Netherlands do not have the ability to discharge 
bills from committees or reassign them to other committees. Furthermore they cannot set a 
limit on the length of committee deliberation (Martin & Vanberg, 2011, p. 38). Therefore, in 
general the Dutch legislature is seen as a strong legislature (Martin & Vanberg, 2011, p. 35). 
Strong legislatures give coalition partners the opportunity to develop policy expertise and 
gather information but also provide them with the opportunity to control the minister of 
another party (Martin & Vanberg, 2011).  
An example that makes the Dutch committee system strong is that a deputy who serves on a 
committee has the ability to specialize on issues that correspond to the policy jurisdictions of 
a certain minister and the department it oversees. This gives them more power to acquire 
information that could be of importance to decide whether a bill or policy is feasible. 
Furthermore, a deputy is given the opportunity to evaluate the proposals of minister and give 
the deputy the means to give alternative policies to a vote even though it is against the wishes 
of the minister (Martin & Vanberg, 2011, p. 39). 
Thies (2001) shows in his study on junior ministers in the Netherlands, Italy and Japan that 
parties are likely to assign junior ministers to possible hostile ministers who have jurisdiction 
over important areas (Thies, 2001). However, the Minister of Defence and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands do not have a junior minister that can keep tabs on them. 
Therefore, it is likely that both coalition parties will regard the Standing Committee for 
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Defence and Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs as the alternative option to monitor 
these ministers. 
VVD and PvdA’s stance on defence policy and foreign policy: Homogeneous or 
heterogeneous? 
Martin and Vanberg argue that the need to control a coalition partner increases when there is a 
greater divergence between both parties on a certain policy (Martin & Vanberg, 2011, p. 98). 
Therefore, to be able to decide whether both the defence policy and foreign policy is 
homogenous or heterogeneous, it is useful to review the election program of both parties and 
their visions on defence and foreign affairs. 
 
Defence policy 
Both ideal policy visions differ considerably from each other. While the PvdA tends to be 
more careful with engaging in new missions and interventions, the VVD regards the military 
as an important tool to spread stability and peace. Furthermore, the PvdA stresses the 
importance of the military personnel, and while the VVD agrees with this, this view is much 
less stressed in the election program of the VVD. Both parties stress the importance of 
NATO. Nevertheless, the VVD is more fond of NATO cooperation and the relationship with 
the EU, while the PvdA specifically states that it is pro-European defence cooperation. Task 
specialisation within an European context is strongly encouraged by the PvdA. Another 
important difference is that the VVD explicitly states that the Netherlands should invest in its 
armed forces and that there should not be any more cuts on the defence budget. While the 
PvdA mentions in its election program that they would not mind reducing the amount of  
fighter jets (VVD, 2012; PvdA, 2012).  Even though there is some overlap of both visions, 
they have different views on how big the defence budget must be and how it should be spend. 
Therefore can be concluded that the defence policy is heterogeneous.   
 
Foreign policy 
The VVD and PvdA have more similar views on foreign policy. Both parties value the 
importance of the promotion of human rights in the world. The PvdA is of the opinion that the 
Netherlands should play an active role in promoting democracy internationally and in 
promoting an effective enforcement of international law. The PvdA also stresses the 
importance to address human rights everywhere in the world, no exceptions made.  The VVD 
would like to see that the Netherlands stands up for human rights, the international legal order 
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and good governance in other countries. Specifically in cooperation with other countries of 
the European Union. However, the VVD does point out that the Dutch government should not 
always address these issues. Priorities should be set on countries where the violation of these 
rights, especially human rights, are the worst. More welfare, peace and safety in the world are 
other important aspects of the VVD’s ideal foreign policy, while a strong and fair and 
sustainable world economy is one of the PvdA’s main goals with regard to foreign policy. 
Striking in VVD’s election program is that the economy is a central feature. For example, 
peace and security and the promotion of prosperity will serve the Dutch interests because it 
would do good to the Dutch economy. While the PvdA’s drive to better the world is because 
they are of the opinion that the elementary conditions for a dignified life should be available 
to everyone in the world (VVD, 2012; PvdA, 2012). Even though there exist differences 
between the VVD’s and PvdA’s ideal foreign policy, it can be viewed as a more 
homogeneous policy than the defence policy.  
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4. Hypotheses 
To be able to examine whether committee members of the governing parties VVD and PvdA 
use the legislative committee system as an instrument to keep tabs on the Minister of Defence 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs two features are of importance: the amount of use of the 
control function of parliament and the amount of support expressed towards a minister during 
meetings with a minister. The other important feature that Martin and Vanberg mentioned, 
amendment capability, does not apply to the Dutch case because Dutch legislative committees 
do not have the power to amend bills (André, Depauw & Martin, 2015). Therefore, this 
feature will not be tested in this research. 
 
Strong legislatures give coalition partners the opportunity to develop policy expertise and 
gather information but also provide them with the opportunity to control the minister of 
another party. Thies argues that multiparty governments have to deal with greater delegation 
problems than single-party governments. In a system where party discipline is present, 
ministers can be sanctioned by their parties if they diverge from the party line. However, 
parties cannot sanction other parties’ ministers when they diverge from the coalition 
agreement (Thies, 2001). Therefore it is expected that the legislative committee system will 
be used more intensively by committee members to keep tabs on another parties minister. 
Therefore the first hypothesis is: 
 
H1: A committee member is more controlling if a committee member and minister are from a 
different party. 
 
This hypothesis reflects the view that the legislative committee system is an important 
instrument that may help solve the tensions of coalition government. Committee members are 
expected to be more controlling towards an another parties’ minister for two reasons. First of 
all, H1 supports Kim and Loewenberg (2005) and Martin and Vanbergs (2011) argument that 
legislative committee systems can be an useful way to keep tabs on coalition partners, 
especially when there is no junior minister present. Secondly,  because the Dutch legislative 
committee system is viewed as an particularly independent and strong legislature, which 
provides the opportunity for committee members to specialize and acquire information 
(Martin & Vanberg, 2011). 
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It is interesting to examine to what extent committee members of the governing parties VVD 
and PvdA in both committees express support towards the a minister of their own party and 
towards the other parties’ minister. It is likely that committee members are more supportive 
towards a minister if they belong to the same party for two reasons: party discipline and 
ideological homogeneity. Martin and Vanberg (2011) assume that party leaders and MPs of 
their party stick to the party line due to strong party discipline, while it is possible that 
committee members support a policy that may not be the ideal policy preference of their 
party. To be able to see the broader image of how committee members behave during 
meetings with a minister, it is of interest to see how often they express support towards a 
minister. Therefore the second hypothesis is:      
 
H2: Coalition committee members are more supportive towards a minister if they belong to 
the same party. 
 
This hypothesis is important for several reasons. First of all, if H2 is accepted it will provide 
support for the theory that committee members are loyal to their party due to party discipline. 
Secondly, if H1 and H2 are both accepted it will show support for the theory that parties use 
the legislative committee system as an instrument to keep tabs on their coalition partners 
(Martin & Vanberg, 2011). Furthermore, if H1 and H2 are both accepted it will show support 
for the theory that the legislative committee system can be used as an alternative instrument to 
keep tabs on coalition partners if there are no junior ministers available (Kim & Loewenberg, 
2005).  
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5. Method and data collection 
This research contains a comparative content analysis of speeches. The focus of my research 
is on committee meetings with a minister. In these meetings committee questions play a 
central role. My dataset consists of 46 transcripts of general meetings, in Dutch called 
Algemeen Overleg (AO). These documents were sourced from the Tweede Kamer’s website 
(Tweede Kamer, 2016). Of each committee 23 documents were selected. The investigated 
timeframe is between November 5th 2012 and March 1st 2016. To avoid that other ministers 
or committees interfere with the interaction between a committee and their corresponding 
minister, AOs were only taken into account if the only people present during a meeting were 
the committee and the corresponding minister. 23 AOs between the Standing Committee for 
Foreign Affairs and Minister of Foreign Affairs met these criteria. However, 42 AOs between 
the Standing Committee for Defence and Minister of Defence met these criteria. Therefore, a 
random sample of 23 AOs of the Standing Committee for Defence was taken to make the 
amount of examined AOs of each committee proportional. The average amount of pages is 
25. 
To be able to examine whether committee members of the governing parties VVD and PvdA 
use the legislative committee system as an instrument to keep tabs on the Minister of Defence 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs two variables are at the centre of my research: the variable 
control and the variable support. The variable control measures the amount of the control 
function of parliament applied by committee members of the coalition parties. The variable 
control is used to measure H1: A committee member is more controlling if a committee 
member and minister are from a different party. The variable support measures the amount of 
support expressed towards a minister by committee members of the governing parties VVD 
and PvdA, this variable is used to measure H2: Coalition committee members are more 
supportive towards a minister if they belong to the same party. In the coding scheme below 
are the criteria present of what can be coded as controlling or as supportive. Each document 
was independently coded for sentences that can be coded as controlling or supportive. For the 
coding scheme below Martin’s coding scheme was used as an example (Martin, 2011). An 
independent samples t-test will be conducted with the purpose to compare the results between 
both committees and both parties and to test whether these results are significant. 
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Coding schemes 
To be coded control, a sentence should have one or more of the following characteristics: 
1) The committee member mentions that he would like more information on a certain subject; 
2) The committee member mentions that he would like to know the position of the minister on a   
certain subject; 
3) The committee member asks if the minister agrees with him; 
4) The committee member has criticism on a certain policy;  
5) The committee member asks a policy related question, that demands the minister to give more 
information on a certain policy; 
6) The committee  member gives a suggestion to the minister on a certain policy. 
Table 1. Coding scheme variable control. 
To be coded supportive, a sentence should have one or more of the following characteristics: 
1) The committee member explicitly expresses support for the minister; 
2) The committee member mentions: he is happy to hear, I understand, I have empathy for, I have 
sympathy for, I support; 
3) If a committee member mentions that his party shares the same vision as the minister; 
4) The committee member gives a compliment to the minister. 
Table 2. Coding scheme variable support. 
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6.  Results and analysis 
Table 3 presents the total and average use of the control function of parliament exercised by 
committee members of the governing parties VVD and PvdA. It also presents the total and 
average amount of support expressed by committee members of the governing parties VVD 
and PvdA. N=92 because at each committee meeting, which were 46 meetings in total, one 
committee member of each party was present. The table indicates that the control function is 
exercised considerably more often than that there is support expressed towards a minister. 
This result suggests that the committee members of the governing parties VVD and PvdA use 
the legislative committee system as an instrument to keep tabs on the Minister of Defence and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. But to get a clearer picture of the results, it is of interest to 
evaluate the results for each committee and party. 
Table 3 
Total and average number of control and support  
 Sum Mean Std. Deviation 
Control 1437 15,62 12,315 
Support 235 2,55 2,211 
N = 92    
Source: Own data set. 
 
The hypotheses were tested by examining the differences between the variables control and 
support and by examining the differences in results of these variables for each committee and 
party. Furthermore, an independent samples t-test was conducted. Table 4 shows the outcome 
of this t-test. The t-test compares the average amount of control and support of committee 
members of the same party but who are in different committees. The hypothesis H0 states that 
there is no significant difference between the averages of both committees. The degrees of 
freedom 44 is the same for every group, this results into a critical value of 2,014 (Argyrous, 
2011, p. 543). Therefore, to accept H0, the t-value should be between -2,014 and 2,014.  
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Table 4 
Results Independent Samples Test  
 
 
 
 
 
Party 
Levene’s Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for equality of means 
F Sig.  t  95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
PvdA Control Equal 
variances 
assumed 
15,867 0 -6,852 44 0 -21,261 -27,514 -15,008 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  -6,852 27,053 0 -21,261 -27,626 -14,895 
Support Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2,781 -0,103 1,093 44 0,28 0,609 -0,514 1,731 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed  
  1,093 36,64 0,282 0,609 -0,52 1,738 
VVD Control Equal 
variances 
assumed 
7,521 0,009 -3,321 44 0,002 -6,174 -9,921 -2,427 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  -3,321 36,673 0,002 -6,174 -9,942 -2,406 
Support Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2,854 0,98 -1,154 44 0,255 -0,826 -2,268 0,616 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  -1,154 37,913 0,256 -0,826 -2,275 0,623 
Source: Own data set. 
 
Hypothesis H1 
H1 assumes that a committee member is more controlling if a committee member and 
minister are from a different party. The variable control measured the amount of the control 
function of parliament applied by committee members of the coalition parties. Figure 1 shows 
the mean of the variables support and control for each party and committee. Based on figure 
1, there is only partial support for H1. H1 is accepted if we look at the results of the PvdA 
committee members. PvdA committee members are more controlling towards the Minister of 
Defence, who is a VVD minister, than towards the PvdA Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
However H1 is not accepted based on the results of VVD committee members. VVD 
committee members are not more controlling towards the PvdA Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
On the contrary, VVD committee members are more controlling towards the VVD Minister of 
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Defence. This result implies that VVD committee members exercise the control function of 
parliament more often to keep tabs on their own parties’ minister than on the coalition parties’ 
minister.  
 
Figure 1. Mean of variables control and support per party and committee. 
Source: Own data set. 
 
While PvdA committee members are more controlling if the minister is from another party, 
VVD committee members are not. The results of VVD committee members do not support 
H1, however this does not imply that the results of VVD committee members do not support 
Martin and Vanbergs argument that committee members are more controlling towards another 
parties’ minister. On the contrary, these results provide support for Martin and Vanbergs 
argument that the level of policy divergence is of importance within coalition governance 
(Martin & Vanberg, 2011, p. 79). As mentioned before, the policy divergence of the VVD and 
PvdA on foreign policy is in general more homogenous than heterogeneous. At the same time 
is the defence policy of both parties more heterogeneous. This explains the t-test result in 
table 4 that there is a significant difference of how often the control function is exercised by 
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both committees. The control function of parliament is exercised more often by committee 
members of the Defence Committee than by committee members of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee.  
 
However, what should be kept in mind is that the investigated AOs of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee are mainly on issues like a relationship with a certain country, human rights issues 
in a certain country and on the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. These meetings 
correspond to the issues where both parties in general have similar stance, while on meetings 
where their stance is more divided, they are held together with another minister. Those 
meetings with more than one minister are not taken into account in this research for the 
simple reason: to avoid that another minister might interfere with the way committee 
members behave towards a certain minister. This explains why committee members of the 
Foreign Affairs committee are generally equally controlling towards the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. Moreover, it especially explains why committee members from both parties are 
equally supportive towards the minister, because they agree with each other on these issues. 
Therefore, Martin and Vanbergs argument that coalition partners are more likely to apply the 
control function towards a ministers whenever there is a greater divergence in preference 
between the coalition partners on a certain issues addressed in a meeting, is a good 
explanation for these results (Martin & Vanberg, 2011, p. 79). 
 
Nevertheless, the conclusion that VVD committee members exercise the control function of 
parliament more often to keep tabs on their own parties minister than on the coalition parties 
minister, should be expounded. Because figure 1 shows that VVD committee members do use 
the control function of parliament considerably more often than that they express support for 
both ministers. The same conclusion applies to PvdA committee members. Therefore can be 
concluded that based on the results of H1, both parties use the control function of parliament 
as an instrument to keep tabs on both their coalition partners minister and on their own 
parties’ minister.  
 
Hypothesis H2 
H2 assumes that coalition committee members are more supportive towards a minister if they 
belong to the same party. The variable support measured the amount of support expressed by 
committee members of the governing parties VVD and PvdA towards a minister. Figure 1 
gives a clear image on the average amount of support expressed for each committee and party. 
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This amount is considerably lower than the mean of the control function exercised by 
committee members. Furthermore, the results of the t-test show that there is no significant 
difference in the amount of support expressed by each party in both committees. This implies 
that coalition committee members are not more supportive towards a minister if they belong 
to the same party. Moreover, there is no significant difference in the extent to which the VVD 
and PvdA express support towards a minister. Both parties express the similar amount of 
support during general meetings. H2 can therefore be rejected. 
 
These results also indicate that there is no big tension between both coalition parties. 
Committee members of both parties are generally equally supportive towards each both 
ministers, this implies that both ministers are equally liked and trusted. Even though that 
committee members of the Defence Committee are much more critical towards the Minister 
of Defence, this minister cannot be categorised as a hostile minister. This is because 
committee members who belong to the same party of the Minister of Defence are more 
controlling towards the Minister of Defence than towards the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
This implies that the Minister of Defence does not try to form policies that may favour her 
own party. As mentioned before, the possible explanation for the fact that committee 
members are more controlling towards the Minister of Defence is that the stance of both 
parties on defence policy is more divergent than on foreign policy.  
 
Nevertheless, the above discussed results are based on averages of all committee members. 
Because each committee member is different, it is of interest to look at the data of each 
committee member. Table 5 shows the data of both variables categorised by each committee 
member. N stands for the total number of attended committee meetings. There are four 
committee members who attended most AOs: committee members Ten Broeke, Vuijk, Eijsink 
and Servaes. There are considerable differences between all committee members.  For 
example, the committee member who carried out the control function of parliament most 
often was PvdA committee member Eijsink. While support was most often expressed by 
VVD committee members Vuijk and Ten Broeke. These results mean that there is a difference 
in to what extent committee members use the legislative committee system as an instrument 
to keep tabs on the minister they are controlling. It also suggests that each single committee 
member has a different relationship with a minister.  
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The purpose of my research was to study how governing parties VVD and PvdA use the 
Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs and the Standing Committee for Defence as an 
instrument to keep tabs on the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence. This is a 
specific case study, the outcome of this research cannot be generalised and applied to the 
committee members of the governing parties in other committees. Therefore, I suggest for 
further research an analysis of every Dutch Standing Committee and of all committee 
members affiliated with one of the governing parties, this would make the research more 
inclusive. However, the results of this case study do provide additional support for the theory 
that parliamentary committees as monitoring mechanisms for coalition governments. 
 
The findings of my research provide support for Kim and Loewenbergs argument that 
legislative committees can be an useful instrument to monitor ministers if there are no junior 
ministers present (Kim & Loewenberg, 2005). From these results can also be concluded that 
besides the fact that the VVD and PvdA party use the legislative committee system as an 
instrument to keep tabs on their coalition partners, they also use it as an instrument to keep 
tabs on their own parties’ minister. Especially in committees where policy divergence 
between coalition parties is bigger, the extent to which parties control and monitor a minister 
increases. Information acquisition is a central feature of the legislative committee system and 
becomes more important when parties are divided on a certain policy. The findings of my 
research support Martin and Vanbergs argument that coalition parties are more likely to keep 
tabs on their partners when there is a greater policy divergence (Martin & Vanberg, 2011, p. 
98). Furthermore, my findings also support the argument that parliamentary systems play a far 
more important role than is often assumed (Martin & Vanberg, 2011, p. 156). The Dutch 
legislative committee system is used by both governing parties to watch and monitor their 
coalition partners and moreover, it is used to watch and monitor ministers of their own party. 
These findings indicate that the legislature is still a relevant institution. 
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Table 5 
Total and average number of control and support categorised by each committee 
member 
Committee Party Committee member 
  
N Sum Mean 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Foreign 
Affairs 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
PvdA 
 
 
 
 
 
Bonis 
  
Control  
4 
 
24 6 
Support 21 5,25 
Servaes 
  
Control  
18 
 
181 10,06 
Support 35 1,94 
Van Laar 
  
Control 1 4 4 
Support 0 0 
 
 
VVD 
 
 
 
De Caluwé 
  
Control 3 30 10 
Support 6 2 
Ten Broeke 
  
Control 20 164 8,2 
Support 53 2,65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defence 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
PvdA 
 
 
 
Eijsink 
  
Control  
16 
 
529 33,06 
Support 30 1,88 
Günal-Gezer 
  
Control 7 169 24,14 
Support 12 1,71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VVD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Berckmoes-Duindam 
  
Control 3 22 7,33 
Support 7 2,33 
Bosman 
  
Control 3 49 16,33 
Support 7 2,33 
Teeven 
  
Control 1 11 11 
Support 11 11 
Vuijk 
  
Control 16 254 15,88 
Support 53 3,31 
Source: Own data set. 
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7) Conclusion 
This thesis analysed to what extent committee members of the governing parties VVD and 
PvdA use the legislative committee system as an instrument to keep tabs on the Minister of 
Defence and Minister of Foreign Affairs. My research consisted out of a comparative content 
analysis of general meetings between the Standing Committee for Defence and the Minister of 
Defence and of general meetings between the Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. The aim was to find out to what extent committee members of the 
governing parties exercise the control function of parliament and express support for a 
minister during these meetings. The results of my analysis show that both parties exercise the 
control function of parliament considerably more often than that they show support for a 
minister.  
 
My findings provide additional support for the theory of parliamentary committees as 
monitoring mechanisms in parliamentary democracies (Martin & Vanberg, 2004; 2011; Strøm 
et al., 2010; Thies, 2001). From this research several conclusions can be drawn. First of all 
can be concluded that coalition parties VVD and PvdA use the Standing Committee for 
Defence and Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs as an instrument to keep tabs on their 
‘own’ ministers and to make sure that they act according to the party line. Secondly, the 
extend in which both coalition parties use the legislative committee system as an instrument 
to keep tabs on their partner depends on the divergence of ideal policies between parties. The 
incentive to watch and monitor a minister becomes stronger on issues that divide the coalition 
internally. This conclusion supports Martin and Vanbergs argument on policy divergence 
(Martin & Vanberg, 2004, p. 25; Martin & Vanberg, 2011, p. 98). Additionally can be 
concluded from this research that committee members of the governing parties VVD and 
PvdA in the Standing Committee for Defence and Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs 
fulfil Mill’s original purpose of parliament (Mill, 1861, p. 73). This study can be regarded as 
an example that the original purpose of parliament is still exercised, even if a MPs party is in 
the government. 
 
From this research can also be concluded that the Dutch parliament and the legislative 
committee system are still relevant, because it gives parties the opportunity to watch and 
control not only their coalition partners, but it also helps check if their own minister is 
drafting and carrying out a policy according to the parties wishes. Furthermore this provides 
support for the argument that parliamentary committees are not solely used for opposition-
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government relations, but also for intra-coalition relations (Martin &Vanberg, 2011).  
Moreover, the findings of this research provide support for the perspective that committees 
can be viewed as an efficient mode to manage information and therefore can be useful to 
acquire more information on a certain policy or subject (Mattson & Strøm, 1995, pp. 250-
255). Besides, the amount of support expressed by all committee members in both committees 
is similar. This indicates that they are equally supportive towards both ministers. This proves 
that even though committee members in both committees carry out the control function of 
parliament and ask mainly questions during meetings with the minister, they still value to 
speak out support for the minister and its policy.  
 
This study was a case study to test the argument that an useful instrument to solve the 
dilemma of coalition governance are parliamentary committees and to test whether coalition 
parties use this instrument to keep tabs on their partners (Kim & Loewenberg, 2005; Martin & 
Vanberg, 2011). From this study can be concluded that both coalition parties do not only use 
the legislative committee system as an instrument to keep tabs on the minister of another 
party, but that it is also used to keep tabs on their own parties’ minister. However, in order to 
get a complete image of how the governing parties VVD and PvdA use the legislative 
committee system as an instrument, it would be best to examine every parliamentary 
committee and the committee members of the coalition parties VVD and PvdA. This would 
be an interesting case for future research. 
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Appendix 
List of documents 
Number Kamerstuk Committee 
1 33400 V nr. 16 Foreign Affairs 
2 23432 nr. 341 Foreign Affairs 
3 31263 nr. 56 Foreign Affairs 
4 33550 nr. 2 Foreign Affairs 
5 32735 nr. 79 Foreign Affairs 
6 21501-02 nr.1271 Foreign Affairs 
7 33400 V nr.156 Foreign Affairs 
8 33750 V nr.11 Foreign Affairs 
9 33750 V nr.46 Foreign Affairs 
10 33750 V nr.53 Foreign Affairs 
11 28498 nr.32 Foreign Affairs 
12 21501-02 nr.1369 Foreign Affairs 
13 33750 V nr.73 Foreign Affairs 
14 32735 nr.110 Foreign Affairs 
15 23432 nr.387 Foreign Affairs 
16 21501-02 nr.1450 Foreign Affairs 
17 21501-02 nr.1456 Foreign Affairs 
18 27925 nr.537 Foreign Affairs 
19 33783 nr.20 Foreign Affairs 
20 20631 nr.169 Foreign Affairs 
21 33783 nr.22 Foreign Affairs 
22 32623 nr.159 Foreign Affairs 
23 21501-02 nr.1595 Foreign Affairs 
24 32733 nr.100 Defence 
25 31125 nr. 18 Defence 
26 25928 nr.23 Defence 
27 32733 nr.125 Defence 
28 31460 nr.33 Defence 
29 33400 X nr.29 Defence 
30 27830 nr.118 Defence 
31 33763 nr.38 Defence 
32 21501-28 nr.111 Defence 
33 30139 nr.133 Defence 
34 31460 nr.48 Defence 
35 31125 nr.36 Defence 
36 27830 nr.133 Defence 
37 33750 X nr.70 Defence 
38 25928 nr.67 Defence 
39 25928 nr.71 Defence 
40 31460 nr.52 Defence 
41 33279 nr.14 Defence 
42 34000 X nr.85 Defence 
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43 33321 nr.6 Defence 
44 34000 X nr.108 Defence 
45 29924 nr.135 Defence 
46 33763 nr.99 Defence 
 
 
